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Abstract
The issues of laws of nature and the modality underlying natural regularity 
have often been treated as one. Metaphysical analysis shows, however, that 
only those positions that assume an ontological commitment to laws of nature 
can be considered within Nomological Realism (NR). Mumford (2004) proposes 
an alternative to NR compatible with the modal commitments commonly 
associated with realist positions. In this view, the weight of modality is not set 
on laws but on properties — understood in terms of powers and propensities. 
A Realist Lawlessness (RL), according to his own nomenclature. In this paper 
I aim to show, first, that Mumford’s arguments against NR do not justify its 
rejection. Second, I argue that the dispositional metaphysic of RL leads at least 
to the same problems as NR. 
Keywords: laws of nature, scientific laws, Nomological Realism, Stephen 
Mumford.
Resumo
As questões das leis da natureza e da modalidade subjacente à regularidade 
natural muitas vezes têm sido tratadas como uma só. No entanto, a análise 
metafísica mostra que só as posições que assumem um compromisso 
ontológico com as leis da natureza podem ser consideradas dentro do Realismo 
Nomológico (RN). Mumford (2004) propõe uma alternativa ao RN compatível 
com os compromissos modais comumente associados a posições realistas. 
Neste ponto de vista, o peso da modalidade não está posto nas leis, mas sim 
em propriedades entendidas em termos de poderes e propensões. De acordo 
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com sua própria nomenclatura, trata-se de um Realismo sem Leis (RSL). 
Neste trabalho pretende-se mostrar, em primeiro lugar, que os argumentos 
de Mumford contra o RN não justificam a sua rejeição e, em segundo lugar, 
defende-se que a metafísica disposicional do RSL leva, pelo menos, aos mesmos 
problemas que o RN. 
Palavras-chave: leis da natureza, leis científicas, Realismo Nomológico, Stephen 
Mumford.
Introduction
The issue of natural laws has been a topic of deep interest to modern sci-
ence and, of course, to the philosophy that had it as its object of inquiry. However, 
systematic analyses of its metaphysical implications are relatively recent. Even in the 
context of the Scientific Realism/Antirealism debate, the status of the laws of nature 
was discussed mostly as a lateral issue. The earliest approaches3 tended to prioritize 
a logico-syntactic analysis and to focus on the possibility of making a distinction 
between authentic laws and mere accidentally true generalizations. However, a 
treatment of the distinction’s metaphysical background was often avoided, or just 
taken for granted as a simple dispute between humeans and necessitarians. While 
that can be seen as the result of the influence of Logical Empiricism — whose reluc-
tance to consider metaphysical issues is well-known — even in more recent disputes 
the notions of ‘scientific law’ (a true, universal statement that describes some real 
regularity in the world) and ‘natural law’ (something other than the mere regularity 
as being the truth-maker of that statement) are often confused or treated as one. 
The contemporary debate, however, takes a more complex form. No one 
seriously doubts that there are regularities in the world. No one seriously calls into 
question that if there is a statement that adequately describes one of those regu-
larities in the past, present and future (a statement that will be universal and true), 
it deserves to be called ‘law’. The sticking point is to determine by virtue of what 
that statement would be true, i.e. whether there is indeed an objective substratum 
that makes the regularity necessary, and not merely a happy coincidence. Some (I 
honestly think that it’s much more complicated than it seems to know exactly how 
many) found in natural laws that substratum: laws are not mere projections of our 
creativity but something in nature, things we discover as supporting the objective 
necessity of regularities, i.e. as its explanatory and ontological principle. Those who 
believe this advocate for Nomological Realism (NR). It should be noted, however, that 
postulating necessary connections between phenomena is not sufficient to support 
NR: it should be maintained that it is the laws of nature and no other thing in the 
world what gives ontological support to that necessity. That is why both humeans 
and anti-humeans can coexist under the shelter of Nomological Antirealism (NA). 
Stephen Mumford devotes his Laws in Nature (2004) to illustrate this point, to 
show, in short, that to deny that laws exist does not imply embracing a metaphys-
ics of mere constant conjunctions, where necessity should be taken as a habit of 
our minds mistaken for a principle. Mumford’s proposal intends to make clear that 
laws are only one possible candidate to explain regularities and the necessitation 
relations that constitute them. They are not the one and only candidate, and by 
no means the best. They are in fact a bad candidate, and his main argument sup-
3 See for example Chisholm (1946), Goodman (1947), and Hempel and Oppenheim (1948). 
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porting that point is what he calls the Central Dilemma: laws are internal to their 
instances or they are external to them; but it turns out that if we consider them to 
be either internal or external to their instances, we cannot give an account of how 
they govern their instances, so the possibility of considering them as the basis of 
regularity would be closed. But there is more: taking them to be external to their 
instances leads us to quidditism regarding the nature of properties. Mumford’s own 
proposal is to take laws out of the picture and endorse a metaphysics of powers 
and propensities: they are able to play the role of laws being immune to the Central 
Dilemma and the charges of quidditism, a Realist Lawlessness (RL), as he likes to 
call his own position.
The primary aim of this work is critical: in “Natural laws as a metaphysical 
issue”, I offer a brief overview of the debate between nomological realists and anti-
realists, reviewing some philosophical positions that exemplify both sides. I give an 
account, specifically, of the general guidelines of Humeanism — as the basis of all 
the alternatives that fall within NA— (“One little thing and then another”) and the 
realist proposals of Brian Ellis and David Armstrong (“Nomological Realism: essences 
and universals”). This sets the scene to present, in the third section (“Mumford vs. 
Nomological Realism”), the fundamental aspects of the Central Dilemma and its 
main consequences regarding the rejection of NR. In addition, I try to discuss this 
argument in order to show that its effectiveness depends on certain notions of 
governing role and natural law that the nomological realist could resist to accept 
(“The Central Dilemma”). I also present a further problem Mumford associates with 
NR: quidditism (“Quidditism”). In “Powers in nature: Realist Lawlessness and the 
problem of quidditism”, I try to establish that the alternative metaphysics proposed 
by Mumford — i.e. RL — entails at least the same difficulties that led to the rejec-
tion of laws. Finally, the last section includes the conclusions and final comments 
of this work. 
Natural laws as a metaphysical issue 
The well-known distinction between scientific laws and accidental general-
izations largely monopolized early discussions around laws. Despite the multiple 
inflections the discussion had, the point then was to give conceptual support to the 
intuitive distinction between necessary correlations of properties (e.g. the correlation 
between ‘being a metal’ and ‘being expansible with heat’) and factually constant 
but contingent correlations (e.g. between ‘being a player for the Chicago Bulls’ and 
‘being taller than 150 centimeters’). However, the elucidation of the nature of that 
necessity was rather a secondary topic, while the main interest were the semantic, 
syntactic and logical considerations that intended to provide a set of sufficient con-
ditions for a statement to be considered a law. Conversely, the discussion between 
nomological realists and antirealists is today, in its basis, metaphysical. There are 
many ways to sketch out a map of this debate, and since the following subsections 
will give an account of the position of some of its main actors, now I will just give a 
purely conceptual picture of the matter. Although offering this picture is not one of 
the aims of this work, as far as I know a pure conceptual map of the debate around 
laws has not been given in the related literature.
Imagine three small possible worlds, call them M0, M1 and M2. M0 is com-
posed of a handful of individuals and properties such that the former instantiate 
the latter; say, individuals a, b and c, and properties F and G. Also suppose that 
all of them (individuals and properties) are observable. In this world it is always 
true that ‘Fa’, ‘Fb’, ‘Ga’ and ‘Gb’. M1 and M2 are identical to M0 in all the aspects 
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described so far4, however, while in M0 it is just a bare fact that all Fs are Gs, in 
M1 all Fs are Gs necessarily. One might think that the difference really is that in 
M0 we are going to find, at some point, an individual which is F and no-G, thus 
showing us that the regularity was in fact contingent. But that is not the case in 
our example; M0 is such that in its whole history all Fs are Gs, always and without 
exception. I think anyone can get some interesting information about her own 
philosophical affiliation wondering whether there is really a difference between 
M0 and M1 or they are in fact the same world. And even wondering whether that 
question should be considered as a meaningful one in the first place. However, 
despite containing necessary connections, M1 is not yet a world of laws. Then M2 
has the same distribution of necessary relations as M2, but includes an extra fea-
ture: natural laws that support such necessity. So the basic question is: What is it 
to be a law? For some (e.g. Armstrong) laws are second order universals instanti-
ated as relations between first order universals (in this case, F and G), while for 
others (e.g. Ellis) they are essential properties of natural kinds. Note that M0, M1 
and M2 are empirically equivalent worlds; no internal or external observer would 
notice any difference in them as systems of entities considered synchronously, or 
in respect of their development over time. However, if their metaphysical differ-
ences are accepted, these are three ontologically distinct worlds. Although the 
metaphysical question about natural laws has many variations that cannot possibly 
be captured in this brief picture, it can be said that for Humean NA our world is 
like M0, for the defenders of RL it is like M1, and for nomological realists our world 
is some version of M2. In other words, the defender of RL rejects the metaphysical 
picture of M0 and M2, since she believes that the former lacks any philosophical 
motivation and the latter is refuted by the Central Dilemma. Nevertheless, before 
we get to that point, I will briefly review the positions against which Mumford 
runs his argument, so it is time to include some proper names.
One little thing and then another
A scientific realist who defends a strictly humean metaphysics would be a 
rare find nowadays. Yet, nowadays nobody seems to be sure about what is, strictly 
speaking, a humean metaphysics. The picture, for those who tend to fall under that 
label, seems to be this: the world is constituted by discrete events, each of them is 
self-containing and both ontologically and causally independent of the rest. Here 
is an analogy that may be illustrative: the world is like a mosaic whose pieces are 
those discrete and causally inert events, where each piece is what it is in itself, inde-
pendently of the rest. Many of them are arranged in regular relations of similarity 
and spatial contiguity, but outside them there is no necessary relation connecting 
them. That is our world, one little thing and then another (Lewis, 1986, p. ix). The 
analogy is appropriate in an additional respect: the independence of each of the 
parts does not imply that there are no regularities; on the contrary, with enough 
dedication we can find many complex patterns in the distribution of the pieces. 
We can realize that every red piece is adjacent to a hexagonal one, or that each 
group of similar black pieces is followed by a number of green pieces determinable 
by some function, etc. The point is that none of these regularities identified by em-
pirical inquiry is determined by an internal necessity (one piece implying another) 
4 The ontological configuration of these strange worlds only intends to eliminate any element that might 
deflect attention from the point that I intend to establish; however, the same argument can be applied to our 
real world and the corresponding equivalent possible worlds.
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or external necessity (the system as a whole implying some distribution). Propos-
als along these lines are usually grouped under the name of ‘regularity theories’. 
Although sometimes regularism is presented as a theory of laws (Psillos, 2002, 
p. 137), it is actually a theory about regularities or constant conjunctions in nature. 
In other words, according to the foregoing metaphysical considerations about laws, 
the regularity theory of laws falls, despite its name, within NA. 
Mumford’s reservations about regularism (mainly focused on its most devel-
oped version, defended by Lewis) are based on a motivational level. Its acceptance 
lies in the adoption of a certain metaphysical picture; if that picture is accepted, 
then the theory follows (Mumford, 2004, p. 49). The problem of regularism then 
lies in the Humean metaphysics that sustains it, but in turn the criticism of that kind 
of metaphysics may not be logical or conceptual. The position is consistent, and it 
cannot be refuted by appealing to intuitions such as the distinction between true 
laws and accidental generalizations, given that such intuitions are not, from the 
beginning, intuitions the regularist has. Mumford’s point is to note that an ontol-
ogy of discrete and causally inert units lacking any necessary connection “is not an 
attractive metaphysic and also that there has been no compelling reason […] for 
why we must accept it” (Mumford, 2004, p. 30). 
The former, undoubtedly, is not a conclusive argument against Humean NA. 
Maybe it is not even a good argument. However, this is not the focus of this paper, so 
it will be better to continue our exploration of the controversy around natural laws.
Nomological Realism: essences and universals
Mumford believes that Brian Ellis believes that laws exist, but they are internal 
to their instances, more precisely, they are the essential properties of natural kinds5. 
In Ellis’s own words:
[…] all the laws of nature, from the most general (for example, the conservation laws 
and the global structural principles) to the more specific (for example, laws defining 
the structures of molecules of various kinds, or specific laws of chemical interaction) 
derive from the essential properties of the object and events that constitute it, and 
must hold in any world of the same natural kind as ours (Ellis, 2001, p. 4).
The quote is somewhat controversial, but is understood by Mumford as claim-
ing that, given that the world has a hierarchical structure of natural classes, the 
essential and constitutive role properties play with respect to those classes is what 
gives rise to necessitation relations between properties. Two options arise here in 
order to elucidate the true metaphysical commitment of essentialism: the laws are 
reducible to those properties or are some kind of entity supervening upon the class 
structure that those properties define. But whether we understand laws as mere 
aggregates of essential properties or as supervening upon them, a simple question, 
according to Mumford, is enough to devastate the argument: how can something 
rule over that to which it is reducible or upon which supervenes? 
Another alternative is then to adopt the externalist conception of laws de-
fended by Dretske (1977), Tooley (1977) and Armstrong (1983) (hereafter DTA). 
5 Despite that, Ellis has denied to be realist about laws or to take them as having a determining role in nature. 
Reviewing Mumford’s book he said: “I did occasionally speak of laws of nature as ‘governing’ various ranges 
of phenomena. This was a loose talk, for which I apologise.” And he adds:  “[L]aws of nature are not things 
in the world, but are general propositions descriptive of the kinds of natural necessities that exist in it. […] [T]
hey are not items that should occur in anyone’s ontology” (Ellis et al., 2006, p. 438).
261
Filosofia Unisinos, 16(3):256-269, sep/dec 2015
The metaphysical status of natural laws: A critique of Stephen Mumford’s Nomological Antirealism
The DTA theory maintains that laws are a type of second order universal. In this 
metaphysical picture properties are understood as actually instantiated universals 
that maintain necessitation relations; these necessitation relations are the laws. 
If having the property F implies having the property G, it is because F and G are 
bound in a certain relation of necessity N, such that N(F,G). This is a metaphysic of 
instantiated universals, so it has an Aristotelian flavor: there would not be universals 
F or G if there were no entities in the world in which F and G are instantiated, as 
there would not be a necessitation relation N (i.e. the law) if there were no instances 
in which actually F makes G necessary6. It is precisely at this point where Mumford 
finds the first weakness of the DTA theory: immanence is a (in the best of cases, 
limited) way of supervenience. The real existence of a law depends on (i.e. derives 
from, or is determined by) the actual instantiation of a causal sequence between 
two universals whose real existence depends on (i.e. derives from, or is determined 
by) the actual instantiation of those properties in the world. So again we must ask 
how it is possible that something can govern something else if it depends on this 
thing to exist. A second weakness is the fact that the relation N is sui generis, al-
most a deus ex machina that puts in the properties the necessity that they cannot 
provide to themselves. In some sense, this does not seem to be far from an ad hoc 
hypothesis to justify the nomological structure of the world.
So, according to Mumford, the essentialist theory of laws and the DTA fail 
to provide an account of how laws govern their instances. Let’s look at this point 
more closely.
Mumford vs. Nomological Realism 
The Central Dilemma
The discussion about the metaphysical status of natural laws has often been 
a topic of interest among scientific realists and antirealists. This is due mainly to the 
fact that, although scientific realism and realism about laws are logically independent 
theses, those who endorse Scientific Realism often show sympathy for some form 
of NR7. In other words: those who believe that atoms or molecules exist tend to 
believe that certain things necessarily happen to them in some given circumstances. 
The problem then lies in determining the place where the weight of that necessity 
has to rest. Nomological realists choose to put it in laws of nature, assuming that 
observable regularities are ontologically based on them. Therefore they assume 
those laws are part of the metaphysical furniture of the world. Besides his specific 
criticism of the various forms that this commitment has taken, Mumford rejects 
it based on his Central Dilemma: laws of nature are internal to the events they 
govern or are external to them. If they are internal to (i.e., if they consist of, or are 
reducible to) their instances, it is not possible to explain how laws govern them. If 
they are external, it is also impossible to provide a characterization of laws as fully 
independent entities that play a governing role over their instances. In order to 
consider the relevance of the argument two basic assumptions must be accepted: 
6 This story does not apply to Tooley, for whom universals should be understood in a platonic sense. Since it is the 
most developed position, I will follow Mumford in taking Armstrong’s theory of laws as the paradigm of DTA. 
7 The central thesis of Scientific Realism is the claim that unobservable entities postulated by our best scientific 
theories exist. It is possible to hold that view without committing oneself to an objective necessity of the type 
required to support NR. Moreover, it would be possible to sustain NR restricting it to the observable world, 
that is, without committing oneself to the type of entities that are the object of the scientific realist belief.
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(a) Laws must be understood as an ‘addition of being’.
(b) Laws must govern their instances.
The first implies that anyone who decides to be realist about laws must com-
mit himself to the fact that laws have some kind of ontological thickness, must 
believe that they are things in the world, an ontological category per se. The second 
assumption implies that the governing role over their instances is required as a 
constitutive feature of both the laws themselves and the feasibility of a metaphysic 
that postulates them. This means that both assumptions also work normatively as 
a criterion of acceptability for any theory of natural laws. Mumford explains that if 
“govern” is theoretically uncomfortable to us, we could replace it by any expression 
that denotes certain determining role for laws, so that the world would be very 
different if they were not in it (Mumford, 2004, p. 145). However, laws cannot play 
that role, whether we consider them external or internal to their instances: if we 
want to escape from Hume and keep objective modality, NR is not a good option. 
The proposal, then, is a metaphysics of properties understood as clusters of powers 
and/or dispositions, capable, according to Mumford, of explaining their necessita-
tion relations without falling prey to the Central Dilemma8.
Those are Stephen Mumford’s reasons. Let’s face the problems in order: 
laws can be understood as internal to their instances in two senses: as constituted 
by them or as supervening upon them. In either case this characterization of laws 
violates the second criterion of acceptability that had been imposed on NR: laws 
do not govern their instances because “[i]t is highly implausible to suppose that 
laws could govern something upon which they are supervenient” (Mumford, 2004, 
p. 103). Many of the theoretical details of Ellis’s philosophical position about natu-
ral kinds are called into question throughout Laws in Nature — including the very 
notion of essential property —, yet the complaint that it fails to give an account 
of the governing/determining role of laws is the only one that directly affects his 
proposal as a form of NR. The problem here is: what does ‘govern’ exactly mean in 
this context? Alternatively, in a more relaxed version, what is it that is meant with 
‘determining role’? 
I do not think I can answer those questions here in the right way. To be hon-
est, I am not sure that Mumford himself can. But let me tell some stories instead. 
I once had an electric stove, actually a very simple device. Searching in the Internet 
I could learn that my stove’s thermostat was constituted by metal pieces with dif-
ferent coefficients of thermal expansion, so it was the stove’s temperature itself 
that modified those parts by switching an on/off device. The thermostat was not 
identical to the stove, but it was certainly part of the stove, which did not work 
without the thermostat, which, on the other hand, did not work without the stove. 
The point is that in some interesting sense of ‘govern’ the thermostat governed the 
temperature of the stove, even if it functionally depended on it. While it is clear 
that this qualifies as a determining role, one would think that the analogy is weak 
because the way in which laws depend on their instances is not the same way in 
which a thermostat depends on the device on which it is installed. So I will tell 
other stories. Many philosophers make their living defending the idea that mental 
processes are epiphenomena of cerebral events, that they supervene upon them; 
yet many of these philosophers would argue that in an interesting sense mental 
phenomena ‘govern’ some brain events. The rules governing the use of our language 
8 The presentation and discussion of this alternative will be the subject of section “Powers in nature: Realist 
Lawlessness and the problem of quidditism”.
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depend — are determined by or derived from — our linguistic practices, yet these 
practices are ‘governed’ by those rules and they play a ‘determining role’ in the 
way we communicate. Something similar may be said of laws, in the usual legal 
sense. Jerry Fodor once wrote: “[…] anyone can play the natural language game; the 
problem is that nobody ever wins” (Fodor, 2000). I do not pretend to say anything 
interesting about how language works or about the human mind — or even about 
my electric stove —, but simply to note that if the possibility that supervening entities 
have some significant role for those entities upon which they supervene is going to 
be objected, much more than a simple diagnosis of implausibility has to be done. 
That is not an acceptable argument. Indeed it is not even an argument, and if it 
were, here is an answer that is also acceptable: that the supervenience of natural 
laws is a very implausible assumption seems to me a very implausible assumption. 
We turn now to the externalist conception of laws. The first objection to it 
argued that it cannot give an adequate account of the governing role laws must 
have over their instances, because being second order universals immanent to their 
instantiations in specific relations makes them ontologically dependent on those 
instantiations, some kind of supervening entity. Carefully considered, this is a curi-
ous objection: the problem of the externalist conception of laws is that its laws are 
not properly external, so it is not really an externalist conception of laws. Therefore, 
it turns out to be vulnerable to the same arguments that make internalist concep-
tions implausible. 
The spirit of this objection seems to be in fact a challenge: to give an account 
of laws as a separate instance, completely transcendent to the events that fall under 
its coverage, but that nonetheless allows explaining how laws can play a governing 
role over them without implying any prior ontological relation. However, I do not 
think that is the real objection, nor that the real problem is how to understand the 
external nature of laws or its governing role. To be honest, I do not even think that 
laws are the real problem here: the problem is not that the requirements imposed 
on them are impossible to fulfill, the problem is that these requirements were not 
there to be met. Mumford did not open the doors of the laws to convince us that 
they are inconvenient, or even that those doors are a real obstacle; he opened them 
just to close them. Thus, the road to a metaphysics of powers and propensities ap-
pears as a natural movement.
Quidditism
However, according to Mumford there is an even more pressing problem for 
the DTA theory that stems from its postulation of metaphysically contingent laws. 
For Armstrong, the laws are necessary in a nomological sense, i.e. they are them-
selves a necessary connection between two universals that occurs in the real world. 
However, that relation does not have to be replicated in every possible world, so 
there are some possible worlds containing necessitation relations between universals 
that are different from those that exist in the actual world. It follows that something 
being a law is different from that being a metaphysically necessary fact. In other 
words, there is a sharp distinction between nomological necessity and metaphysi-
cal necessity. What is wrong with this conception? The problem is that it implicitly 
assumes categoricalism about properties. A property F that in the actual world 
causes necessarily the property G could not do so in, say, M4, and cause instead Z. 
That property could actually not do in M4 anything of what it does in this world 
and still be the same property F; i.e. the identity of a property is independent of 
its causal role or causal profile. It depends then on something else; but that is all 
we can say: what makes F to be the property that it is is a ‘something’, a quidditas 
264
Filosofia Unisinos, 16(3):256-269, sep/dec 2015
Bruno Borge
which underlies its causal role. So for Mumford the third reason which makes the 
externalist conception of laws undesirable is that it implies quidditism regarding 
properties. Quidditism states that the essence of a property is given independently 
of its theoretical/causal roles, so the real essences of categorical properties — i.e. 
their quidditas — are condemned to remain hidden from empirical inquiry. 
One might ask what is so wrong with quidditism, why do not just happily ad-
mit it within NR. After all, what is the harm of one more epicycle to an already highly 
speculative metaphysics?9 To begin with, there are a number of obvious concerns 
about quidditism (of course, besides being an old fashioned metaphysics): first, it 
has some counterintuitive consequences — for example, there could be infinitely 
many possible worlds which were identical in their observable and unobservable 
parts, but each could have a completely different set of fundamental properties. 
Second, even if admissible in a broader philosophical context, it does not seem to 
be a convenient move in an account of laws. It’s expectable that one wants to say 
that the nature of a property is not completely independent of the relationships 
it maintains with other properties and hence not completely independent of the 
type of laws that property will be involved in, which is the case if quidditism is 
true. Third, doctrines on laws are usually related to naturalism, but if the ultimate 
nature of properties is inaccessible by any means to empirical inquiry, it turns out 
that naturalism is false if quidditism is true. I believe those are sufficient reasons, so 
I join Mumford in his rejection of quidditism. Nevertheless, it should be noted that 
is enough for the purposes of this paper that he believes so. My aim is to show that 
RL implies quidditism as much as NR does, so it should also be rejected according 
to Mumford’s own standards.           
As we saw, the Central Dilemma intended to show that both the internal and 
the external forms of NR fail to account for the governing role of laws. Nevertheless, 
that point depends on a questionable and unclear notion of governing role. But as 
far I can see, the problem with laws has never been other than quidditism, because 
I suspect that the problem for Mumford has been quidditism from the beginning. 
The essential properties of Ellis or the categorical properties of NR support modality 
at the expense of assuming that they directly or indirectly depend on an objective 
and inaccessible substrate that has a non-relational character. Mumford considers it 
unacceptable, and I think he is right. However, as I hope to show in the next section, 
his RL cannot do better as long as it also implies a form of quidditism.
Powers in nature: Realist Lawlessness  
and the problem of quidditism
If the preceding considerations are correct, the Central Dilemma fails to es-
tablish a compelling reason to reject NR. However, it could be argued that as long 
as NR still implies quidditism, a metaphysics of powers and propensities may be 
preferable given that it does not imply that undesirable thesis. That is how Mumford 
presents powers: they are capable of doing all the work laws do without falling 
prey to the Central Dilemma nor implying quidditism. But is this really the case? 
A property, Mumford argues, is merely (i.e. is constituted by) a cluster of powers 
and propensities. The identity of a property is not independent of its causal profile, 
instead this identity is the sum total of its causal propensities (whatever it can do) 
and nothing else, so there is no dissociation between some intangible essence 
and a set of propensities that, at least in principle, can be empirically assessed. 
9 I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer of this journal who called my attention to this point. 
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If the causal profile of a property were to be modified, we would not be looking 
at the same property. The identity of a property is determined by extension, by the 
powers that constitute it. There are some common concerns about proposals of 
this kind. One might ask whether the cluster of powers should be described using 
disjunctions or conjunctions; also, whether it is reasonable to think that a property 
ceases to be the property that it is if it loses one or some of its powers, or if it gains 
a new one. In any case those are not problems only for RL — if they are problems 
at all —, but for any other form of dispositionalism, so it will be better to ignore 
them and move on10. However, properties are powers and to move on involves 
asking at least what a power is. This problem is not new; it goes back to the logi-
cal positivists. Dispositions were introduced precisely because some properties are 
never actualized and therefore are never empirically accessible (see Carnap, 1928, 
1936-1937). So we have some clues: first, a power is not a mere potentiality, but 
it is itself in some sense actual. It is plausible to think, we are told, that a broken 
glass was breakable before actually breaking. Another clue: the relation between a 
power and its manifestation would not be merely analytical, that is to say what is 
being defended here is not just a metaphysics that consists of instructions on how 
to add the suffix “able” to some known terms of our language to form words like 
“breakable” or “bendable”. Returning to the broken glass, the propensity or power 
(I admit sometimes I cannot see the difference) was real and was present in the 
glass before its manifestation, it was in a certain way actual. 
We now know more about what power is not, but our question remains 
unanswered: where does the identity of a power rest? Mumford seems to do not 
intend to answer it directly, so we should try an alternative. The identity of a power 
cannot be in the property that the power constitutes, as that property is something 
more than its powers; if so, we would just be falling into quidditism. But could each 
power contain in itself the principle of its own identity? Considering more carefully 
the very notion of power, some curious consequences arise. For example, a property 
would contain in itself infinite powers. Mumford’s own example says that a sphere 
with a 5 cm diameter would have the power to pass through a 6 cm round hole, 
and of course through a 7 cm round hole, and so on. But let’s stick to the issue of 
identity. A power does — or would do — certain things in certain circumstances. 
It has, say, some Factual Implications (FI), manifested or not. In fact some of them 
will never come to be manifested, but this does not matter, as they are real in the 
sense that the fragility of a glass that will never break is also real. So given that 
the identity of a power cannot rest on the property of which it is part — because 
it’s precisely the other way around: the identity of a property lies in the powers of 
which it’s constituted —, it rests on the set of its FI or on something else. The latter 
is inadmissible; if the identity of power is determined by something other than the 
whole of its FI, it could be possible to find two powers with the same FI — which 
is to say, two powers that can do exactly the same things —, but that still are two 
different powers. And then there could be two different properties with exactly the 
same causal profile, which is not only inconsistent with the above, but with the basic 
purpose of this theory. Then, the nature of a power can only be determined by its 
FI: what a power is, is just what it can do. 
However, it cannot be just that. Let’s present the argument as we should: the 
nature of a power is exhausted by (i.e. it is, in the extensional sense) the set of its 
FI, or it is something else, but ontologically dependent on those FI, i.e. some kind 
of entity supervening upon a set of not actualized dispositions. The first horn of 
10 For the treatment of this and other problems associated with powers see Handfield (2009), Ellis (2010) and 
Groff and Greco (2013). 
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this dilemma could not be the case; if the nature of a power were exhausted in its 
FI, then we would go back to the empty notion of potentiality — which Mumford 
explicitly rejects — and it would not make sense to say that a power has some kind 
of actuality when is not manifested. In sum, Mumford’s philosophical position would 
be reduced to assertions like “objects fall when one pushes them”. The only way 
out of this problem is to understand FI as an addition of being, but that would be a 
quite strange metaphysics. The fragility of a glass should be understood extension-
ally as the set of its FI, i.e. as the set of those possible times in which, under the 
right circumstances, the glass would break. But supposing that there is a glass that 
stays in one piece forever, in what sense are the FI that constitute its fragility real? 
They could not be real in the sense that manifestations are, as manifestations are 
events that occur in space and time. Non-actualized FI must have a different kind 
of existence, what is often called subsistence in the context of discussions around 
non-existing entities11. This supposes a serious multiplication of entities since each 
power is reduced to an infinite number of subsistent FI, and just a little of them 
(or maybe none of them) will turn out to be real manifestations of the power. And 
if this doesn’t seem worrying enough, there is another major concern to be faced: 
In what sense could it be said that the FI that constitute fragility are present in the 
glass? Objects are constituted by properties, properties by powers, and powers by 
subsistent FI, but how could this be? How could an existing power be constituted 
by non-existing events? This seems to be a dead-end. 
Mumford’s own solution to this problem is to say that powers are  neither 
directed towards their FI nor to their particular manifestations; powers are powers 
for the instantiation of a property, i.e. a universal: “[P]owers are directed towards the 
properties rather than the particular instantiations of those properties at particular 
times and places, […] the universal is what a power is a power for...” (Mumford, 
2004, p. 194). This implies some obvious complications. Firstly, properties were 
defined as clusters of powers and dispositions, but now with universals coming 
to the rescue powers seems to depend on properties. As soon as a power can stay 
uninstantiated forever, its corresponding universal must be real (independently of its 
instantiations) for the power to exist; without its corresponding property a power 
cannot be a power for that property. What started as a metaphysic of immanent 
powers and propensities is now becoming a theory of transcendent universals. 
Certainly that is serious enough, but for sure that’s not the most worrying 
point concerning the solution proposed by Mumford. The problem to be faced now 
is in fact implicit in that solution: powers could not be reduced to their FI, instead 
powers are directed towards universals. So we must ask again: what is a power? 
A power cannot be just what it does; if it could be reduced to its manifestations it 
would be impossible to explain how two powers that are not manifested are in fact 
two different powers. It would be exactly the same thing to be breakable as to be 
flammable, under the assumption that both dispositions will never be actualized: 
as soon as they are non-actualized powers, they would be identical unless they are 
somehow directed to their FI. But on the other hand, a power cannot be what it can 
do; it could not be, as we saw, reduced to its FI. A power is just something directed 
towards a universal; but because its manifestations are not necessary, the universal 
can exist uninstantiated, so the only difference between two distinct unmanifested 
powers is that they are somehow pointing towards two different universals. So pow-
ers are neither the universals themselves nor  their instances, they’re just something 
directed towards universals. Nothing in the causal profile of a power — i.e. in the 
11 See, for example, Russell (1905) and Quine (1953).
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things that it does or can do — is constitutive of its identity, instead it’s determined 
by a mysterious relation that is not participation or instantiation, but some kind 
of orientation towards a universal12. Apart from that relation and independently 
of their causal role, powers are just that: something, an essence, a quidditas. Thus 
this metaphysic of powers and propensities implies precisely the problem it was 
designed to address, and if NR was rejected because it implies quiddtism, RL should 
be abandoned for the same reason.
Conclusion
There are many ways to talk about laws of nature, and most of them are just 
informal or figurative ways to talk about other important philosophical problems 
such as modality, causation, regularities, explanation, scientific realism, etc. One 
could have a realist attitude towards all those issues and still not be a nomological 
realist. Facing questions such as ‘are there necessary connections in nature?’, ‘are 
there nomological foundations for scientific explanation?’ or ‘are there regular 
causal patterns in the world?’ many philosophers — and that includes me — would 
answer: ‘of course there are!’, but this is not enough to support NR; in order to 
do so one has to believe that laws are things in the world. Humeans defend an 
irrefutable but unappealing metaphysic; on the other hand, the so-called internal-
ist conception of laws is in fact a theory about essential properties and natural 
classes, and its discourse about laws is — if one believes Ellis — nothing more than 
a loose talk. The metaphysical discussion around laws is thus a dialogue between 
Mumford and the defenders of the DTA — they are nomological realists since they 
do believe that laws are things in the world.  Mumford’s major point against them 
is that laws, as they conceive them, are mere supervening entities and then cannot 
govern their instances. This objection is based, as I showed, both on an imprecise 
notion of ‘governing role’ and an unjustified charge of implausibility. 
So the real problem is quidditism. And that’s because, ultimately, Mumford’s 
main concern is to give a convincing metaphysical picture of the modality of our 
world. He believes that modality has to be an immanent feature of objects. That’s 
why he rejects regularist theories for being unappealing. That’s also the reason for 
his rejection of natural laws: the modal character of relations between phenomena 
cannot be added from outside, since being modally related to other properties has 
to be a constitutive feature of what it is to be a property. Nonetheless, without 
the ‘N’ relation Armstrong’s properties are not very different from the tides in the 
Humean mosaic. But he has to pay the price of putting the weight of modality on 
the shoulders of powers, and that is: the ontological dependence of powers on uni-
versals and quidditism. So there are no powers without universals, and the identity 
of a power is not determined by its relations to other powers; it has nothing to do 
with its causal profile, but it’s fixed by a mysterious non-causal relation in which 
it’s directed towards a universal.
From the beginning, the aim of this work was not to solve this problem but 
to show it. Anyway, I do not want to finish without giving any clue about what I 
believe is the way out of this problem. Despite thinking that Mumford’s disposition-
alism entails quidditism — just like NR does —, I believe its main motivation — i.e. 
12 Even if the nature of the relation could be somehow clarified, it should be noted that this relation cannot be 
itself causal. For a body to be heatable is to be constituted by a power that is directed to the universal ‘heat’. The 
causal profile of that power is determined by the things it can cause (e.g. heat other bodies) or that can cause 
its manifestation (e.g. exposure to heat), but the relation it maintains with the universal is not one of them, it 
is not itself a causal relation, so it is not part of the causal profile of the power but its metaphysical foundation.
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to give an account of immanent natural modality — is right. I also believe that not 
every form of dispositionalism necessarily entails quidditism. 
It seems that if one is not willing to believe in laws as things in the world, 
one should accept the existence of powers as things in the world. But why should 
one do so? Why does one have to think of the basic ontological constituents as 
things? In recent years, defenders of Ontic Structural Realism (OSR) have been 
trying to show that objects can be thought of in purely structural terms and 
that it is possible to develop a metaphysic that assigns ontological priority to 
relations over individuals. If the modal nature of the structures postulated by 
OSR could be explained in terms of powers and dispositions — as Esfeld (2009) 
has suggested —, we may retrace our steps to find a solution to the problem 
about the identity of powers. According to Mumford, the identity of a power is 
determined by a relation between the power and a universal, but why can we 
not start thinking that the power is itself that relation? It may look strange at 
the beginning, but it is coherent with the idea that an unmanifested power is 
in itself nothing but the possibility of the instantiation of a property, some kind 
of ‘place holder’ for the manifestation of a universal. Even I cannot think of this 
possibility as a definitive solution yet, and much more has to be done in order 
to consider it that way. But I believe that a structuralist metaphysics, such as 
the one proposed by OSR, is a promising way to solve a handful of interesting 
philosophical problems. A lot of hard work needs to be done, but this is always 
great news for philosophers. 
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